Relates to motions for summary judgment.
Ayes (59): Addabbo, Avella, Ball, Bonacic, Boyle, Breslin, Carlucci, DeFrancisco, Diaz, Dilan, Farley, Felder, Flanagan, Gallivan, Gianaris, Gipson, Griffo, Grisanti, Hannon, Hassell-Thomps, Hoylman, Kennedy, Klein, Krueger, Lanza, Larkin, Latimer, LaValle, Libous, Little, Marcellino, Marchione, Martins, Maziarz, Montgomery, Nozzolio, O'Brien, O'Mara, Parker, Peralta, Perkins, Ranzenhofer, Ritchie, Rivera, Robach, Sampson, Sanders, Savino, Serrano, Seward, Skelos, Smith, Squadron, Stavisky, Stewart-Cousins, Tkaczyk, Valesky, Young, Zeldin
Excused (2): Espaillat, Golden
TITLE OF BILL: An act to amend the civil practice law and rules, in relation to motions for summary judgment
PURPOSE OF GENERAL IDEA OF BILL: The purpose of this bill is to solve what has become a vexing and frustrating problem encountered by many attorneys: how to determine which deadline for a summary judgment motion applies to a given case.
JUSTIFICATION: CPLR 3212 (a) was amended by Chapter 492 of the Laws of 1996 in an effort to curtail abusive motion practice, in which a motion for summary judgment was often made immediately before trial, resulting in unwarranted delay.
A principal difficulty, which has now arisen as a result of the 1996 amendments, stems from the undefined term "the court." At present, deviations from the 120-day post-Note-of-Issue ("Nor) default deadline may be found in County rules, part rules, individual judge's rules, and decisions within each case. The information, where published, is difficult to locate and may not be up-to-date.
Since the Court of Appeals' decision in Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 (2004) held that a failure to comply with the applicable rule renders the motion fatally defective, absent "good cause" shown for the delay, this legislation is needed to make identification of and compliance with the appropriate deadline less burdensome. Indeed, the confusion has already engendered inconsistent Appellate Division decisions on whether confusion concerning the applicable rule is itself "good cause" for missing the shorter deadline (contrast Crawford v Liz Claiborne, Inc., 45 A.D.3d 284 15t Dept. 2007, with Gomez v Penmark Realty Corp., 50 A.D.3d 607 15t Dept. 2008), and the Court of Appeals' decision in Crawford v Liz Claiborne, Inc., 2008 NY Slip Op 07989 (10/23/08), had to parse the language of two conflicting rules to find that Brill did not apply.
This amendment would limit the search for a deadline shorter than the statutory default to one place: the prior Orders in the specific case.
It also serves the salutary function of allowing Judges more flexibility in setting summary judgment deadlines, taking into account factors unique to each case, such as its complexities, outstanding discovery, number of parties, and the number of parties seeking summary judgment, as well as considerations which may change with time, such as current trial calendar congestion.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A6693 of 2009 referred to codes. 05/27/11 referred to codes 01/04/12 referred to codes
FISCAL IMPLICATIONS: This bill would have no financial impact on the State.
EFFECTIVE DATE: This act shall take effect immediately upon its becoming law and shall apply to all actions pending or commenced on and after such date.
STATE OF NEW YORK ________________________________________________________________________ 6128 IN SENATE (PREFILED) January 8, 2014 ___________Introduced by Sen. DeFRANCISCO -- read twice and ordered printed, and when printed to be committed to the Committee on Judiciary AN ACT to amend the civil practice law and rules, in relation to motions for summary judgment THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEM- BLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS: Section 1. Subdivision (a) of rule 3212 of the civil practice law and rules, as amended by chapter 492 of the laws of 1996, is amended to read as follows: (a) Time; kind of action. Any party may move for summary judgment in any action, after issue has been joined; provided however, that the court BY ORDER SPECIFIC TO THE CASE may set a date after which no such motion may be made, such date being no earlier than thirty days after the filing of the note of issue. If no such date is set by the court, such motion shall be made no later than one hundred twenty days after the filing of the note of issue, except with leave of court on good cause shown. S 2. This act shall take effect immediately and shall apply to all actions pending or commenced on and after such effective date.EXPLANATION--Matter in ITALICS (underscored) is new; matter in brackets [ ] is old law to be omitted. LBD03858-01-3