Bill S438-2013

Enacts the "reproductive health act"; repealer

Enacts the "reproductive health act"; provides a fundamental right to choose contraception and the right of a female to determine the course of a pregnancy; authorizes abortion prior to viability; defines terms; decriminalizes abortion.

Details

Actions

  • May 8, 2014: DEFEATED IN HEALTH
  • Feb 28, 2014: NOTICE OF COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION - REQUESTED
  • Jan 8, 2014: REFERRED TO HEALTH
  • Jan 9, 2013: REFERRED TO HEALTH

Meetings

Votes

VOTE: COMMITTEE VOTE: - Health - May 6, 2014
Ayes (8): Savino, Rivera, Montgomery, Hassell-Thompson, Peralta, O'Brien, Hoylman, Serrano
Nays (9): Hannon, Ball, Farley, Felder, Golden, Larkin, Seward, Young, Martins

Memo

BILL NUMBER:S438

TITLE OF BILL: An act to amend the public health law, in relation to enacting the "reproductive health act" and revising existing provisions regarding abortions; to amend the penal law, the criminal procedure law, the county law and the judiciary law, in relation to abortion; to repeal certain provisions of the education law relating to the sale of contraceptives; and to repeal certain provisions of the penal law relating to abortion

PURPOSE: To codify the protections recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade and in subsequent cases that confirmed the right of individuals to make reproductive determinations, this bill establishes a fundamental, statutory right to privacy in making personal reproductive decisions and updates New York's abortion and contraception laws to correct constitutional defects and ensure that abortion is treated as a health matter.

SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS: Section 1 of the bill provides that the bill shall be known as the "Reproductive Health Act".

Section 2 of the bill creates a new Article 17 of the Public Health Law (PHL), which establishes in statute affirmative reproductive rights, specifically: (1) the fundamental right of every individual to choose or refuse contraception, and (2) the fundamental right of every female to determine the course of her pregnancy. Section 2 of the bill further states that an abortion may be performed by a qualified practitioner in the absence of fetal viability and at any time when necessary to protects a female's life or health.

Section 2 of the bill also provides that the senate shall not deny, regulate or restrict these fundamental tights, except by law, regulation or policy that is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling State interest or by a generally applicable law or regulation governing matters such as practitioner licensing, pharmaceuticals and medical devices, and medical procedures.

Section 2 additionally prohibits the State from discriminating against the exercise of reproductive rights in the provision of benefits, facilities, services, or information. Section 2 of the bill also states that nothing contained in the new PHL Article 17 alters any existing protections under state or federal law or regulation that permit a health care provider to refrain from providing abortions due to the provider's religious or moral belief.

Section 2 of the bill further sets forth certain definitions. In particular, the bill defines fetal viability as the point in pregnancy when, as determined by a physician or other qualified practitioners acting in good faith in accordance with generally accepted medical standards: (1) the gestational age of the fetus, measured from the first day of the woman's last menstrual period, is at least 24 weeks, and (2) there is a reasonable likelihood of the

fetus sustained survival outside the uterus without application of extraordinary medical measures.

Section 3 of the bill amends § PHL 4164 to provide that in the case of an abortion performed after a fetus is considered viable, the procedure may be delayed for the arrival of a second physician to take charge of a live birth only if the delay will not jeopardize the females life or health.

Section 4 of the bill repeals Education Law § 6811(8), which pertains to the sale, distribution, advertisement and display of contraceptives.

Section 5 and 7 of the bill repeal the five abortion-related crimes contained in the Penal Law, amend the title of Penal Law article 125 to delete the reference to abortion, and delete the definition of "abortional act" and "justifiable abortional act" from Penal Law § 125.05.

Section 6 of the bill amend the definition of "homicide" to delete references to "unborn child" and abortion.

Section 8 and 9 of the bill amend the first and second degree manslaughter statutes to delete the sections relating to causing a death of a female during the performance of an abortion.

Section 10, 11, and 12 of the bill make conforming changes by removing references to the crime of abortion in the Criminal Procedure Law, the County Law, and the Judiciary Law.

Section 13 of the bill provides that the bill would take effect immediately.

EXISTING LAW: Several New York statutes are unenforceable because they fail to protect rights recognized by the federal constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. This bill revises New York law to remove the unenforceable provisions.

Article 125 of the Penal Law defines the crime of first-degree abortion and first-degree self abortion as homicides. Abortion or self-abortion is criminal unless justifiable, which means that it is a medical procedure performed with a female's consent: (1) under a reasonable belief that it is necessary to save the woman's life; or (2) when a woman is no more than twenty-four weeks pregnant. The crimes of manslaughter in the first and second degrees both include sections that impose criminal liability when a woman dies during the performance of an abortion that is not justifiable. Several components of article 125 conflict with decisions of the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade and subsequent cases. In particular, Article 125 does not authorize a later-term abortion when a woman's health is at stake, and also criminalizes certain abortions performed before viability but after 24 weeks - both circumstance that conflict with the Roe line of cases, making current New York law unenforceable.

PHL § 4161(1) provides that abortion performed after the twelfth week of pregnancy may be performed only in a "hospital" and only on an in-patient basis. The subdivision further provides the abortion

performed after the twentieth week of pregnancy must be attended by a second physician who is to take charge of and provide immediate medical care for any live birth that may result from such abortion. This statute cannot be enforced in its current form in the State of New York due to several United States supreme court decisions that effectively invalidated various aspects of the law.

Education Law § 6811(8) prohibits the sale distribution of contraceptives to minors under the age of sixteen, requires the sale of contraceptives to person who are sixteen or over may be authorized only by a licensed pharmacist, and prohibits the advertisement or display of contraceptives. This statute was found to be unconstitutional, as applied to non-prescription contraceptives, by the United States Supreme Court in 1977, and thus is not followed.

STATEMENT IN SUPPORT: In 1970, New York legalized abortions in some circumstances, thereby recognizing that a woman has a fundamental right to make decisions about the course of her pregnancy. Three years later, the United States Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.113(1973), holding that a woman has a fundamental right, protected by the federal constitution, to an abortion prior to fetal viability and, in cases there her life or health are at risk after viability. During the three decades since Roe v. Wade was decided, there has been numerous federal court decisions clarifying the scope to abortion, but New York's laws have never been updated and certain provisions are clearly unconstitutional.

Significantly, New York law currently does not contain any statement affirmatively recognizing a woman's right to choose the course of her pregnancy. Instead, the statuary contours of legal abortion are found only in negative form; the Penal Law sets forth the circumstances in which abortions are illegal, and only from those provisions can one discern the circumstances in which abortions are permitted.

Specifically, the Penal Law makes abortion a crime unless the woman is no more than 24 weeks pregnant or an abortion is necessary to save her life. These provisions deprive a woman of her constitutional rights as articulated by Roe because they criminalize an abortion performed after 24 weeks of pregnancy, even if the fetus is non-viable, and they criminalize a post-viability abortion that is necessary to protect a woman's health.

This bill corrects those provisions of State law which unconstitutionally burden a woman's right to obtain an abortion, and establishes an affirmative right to make reproductive health decisions in law. The bill eliminates Penal Law provisions to abortion, which draw an unnecessary distinction between abortion procedures and other medical procedures. These changes are similar to initiatives pursued by other states over the past decade- including California, Connecticut Hawaii. Maine, Maryland, Nevada, and Washington - which affirmatively recognizes a woman's fundamental right to make reproductive health decisions in statute or constitution and ensure that abortion is treated as a matter of women's health, not as a matter of criminal law.

This bill adds a new Article 17 to the Public Health Law (PFL) entitled "Reproductive Health Act" - which affirms that a pregnant woman has a fundamental right to abortion when a fetus is not viable or if an abortion is necessary to preserve her life or health. The bill leaves the determination of whether a fetus is viable to the good faith medical judgment of a qualified physician or other practitioner, exercised in accordance with generally accepted medical standards as applied to the facts of the particular case.

Viability exists at the point in pregnancy when: (1) the gestational age of the fetus, measured from the first day of the woman's last menstrual period, is at least 24 weeks, and (2) there is a reasonable likelihood of the fetus's sustained survival outside the uterus without application of extraordinary medical measures. This standard incorporates accepted medical practices, provides guidance to practitioners in exercising their good faith medical judgment and is intended to prevent the abortion of viable fetuses, except when necessary to protect a woman's life or health.

While the bill repeals Penal Law provisions pertaining to abortion, sufficient protections still exist to address abortions which are performed by health care practitioners under circumstances that constitute unprofessional, tortuous or criminal conduct. Such practitioners can be subject to professional sanctions, civil liability, or criminal prosecution. This ensures that abortion is treated like any other medical procedure, subject to the same laws, regulations and principles that generally govern the conduct of medical practitioners.

For example, professional misconduct proceedings, which could result in penalties such as suspension, limitation, revocation, or annulment of the practitioner's license, could be commenced if the practitioner performs a procedure incompetently or performs a procedure which is outside the scope of his or her practice. Similarly, an abortion provider, like any other health care practitioner, could be subject to a medical malpractice lawsuit in civil court for injuries caused to a woman during a negligent performed procedure. See Kusterman v. Glick, 107 A.D2d664(2d Dept.1985), app. Dismissed, 64 N.Y. 2d 1040(1985).

If a woman were to die during an abortion procedure as a result of criminally negligent or reckless conduct by a physician, the physician could be criminally prosecuted, just like any other health care provider who caused injury to a patient as a result of such conduct. See, e.g. People v. Benjamin, 270 A.D.2d 428 (2d Dept. 2000)(upholding depraved indifference murder conviction based on defendant physician's conduct after he inflicted a fatal wound during an abortion procedure).

Moreover, there will continue to be sanctions if an unlicensed person performs and abortion or makes a viability determination, or holds himself or herself out as being able to do so. Education Law §6512 provides that if any person performs, or holds himself or herself out as being authorized to perform, an act which requires a professional license, he or she may be prosecuted for the unauthorized practice of a profession, a class E felony. Thus, someone who engages in abortion

procedures without a license faces the criminal sanctions as any other unlicensed person who performs a medical procedure.

The bill's elimination of the Penal Law provisions pertaining to abortion does not mean that there are no sanctions available to punish an act, such as assault, which is committed against a pregnant woman without consent and results in termination of a pregnancy or renders a viable fetus non-viable. Depending on the circumstances, such injuries would constitute "physical injury" or " serious physical injury" to the woman, as those terms are defined by Penal Law § 10.00, and could serve as the basis for criminal liability for several assault and assault-related offenses. See People v. Vercelletoo, 135 Misc.2d 40,46-47 (Ulster Co. Ct 1987) (finding that the destruction of placenta and miscarriage of seven-month fetus constituted a serious physical injury to the woman under the Penal Law); cf. People v. Thompson; 224 A.D. 2d 950 (4th Dept. 1996) (suggesting that evidence that victims suffered a miscarriage would be admissible as proof of serious physical injury to the victim). The perpetrators could also be answerable for his or her actions in a civil lawsuit brought by the victim. See Insurance Law §§ 5102(2) and 5104 (including" loss of a fetus" in the list of personal injuries which, if experienced as the result of a motor vehicle accident, constitute "serious injury" and can serve as the basis of a lawsuit notwithstanding the no-fault system).

As noted, the bill seeks to ensure that abortion is treated as a health matter and that women are free to make reproductive health decisions. Accordingly, the bill provides that the State is prohibited from discriminating against the exercise of reproductive rights in the provision of benefits, facilities, services, or information, which is intended to ensure continued public funding of abortion services. However, as with any other health matter, the right to make a decision about the course of medical treatment is not completely unfettered; as expressly stated in new PHL Article 17, as the State may infringe upon the fundamental right to have an abortion, but only by narrowly tailored law, regulation or policy, or by statutes and regulation of general applicability that pertain to matters such as professional licensing or regulation of medical facilities.

For example, current New York law addresses certain aspects of later-term abortions under PHL § 4164, requiring that abortions after twelfth week of pregnancy must be performed in a hospital on in-patient status and that a second physician must be present if an abortion is performed after viability to take charge of any resulting live birth. The bill does not seek to eliminate regulation of later-term abortion, but it does correct several constitutional deficiencies associated with the statute. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 43839(1983) (invalidating an Akron, Ohio ordinance requiring abortions after 12 weeks of pregnancy be performed in a hospital); over-ruled on other grounds, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476,481-82 (1983) (invalidating a Missouri requirement that abortions after 12 weeks of pregnancy be performed in a hospital); Thornbugh v. American College of Obstetricians and

Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (finding the second physician requirement to be unconstitutional because it did not include an exception for emergencies). Specifically, the bill amends PHL §4164 to: (1) permit abortions to be performed after viability in appropriate Article 28 facilities, which include general hospital and clinics, without requiring in-patients status; (2) adopt the viability standard in determining when a second physician must be present during an abortion; and (3) provide an exception to the second physician requirement when delay in securing the second physician's attendance would endanger the woman's life or health The bill also provides that the new PHL Article 17 does not alter any existing protections under existing "conscience clauses" - state or federal laws or regulations that permit a health care provider to refrain from providing abortions due to the provider's religious or moral beliefs.

Finally, in addition to establishing in statute the right to an abortion, this bill also contains an affirmative statement of reproductive rights, to make clear that in New York all individuals have the right to use or refuse contraceptives. The bill also repeals Education Law § 6811 (8) because the provision was expressly found to be unconstitutional, as applied to non-prescription contraceptives, by the Supreme Court in Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678(1977).

FISCAL IMPLICATIONS: This bill is anticipated to have no fiscal implications.

EFFECTIVE DATE: This act shall take effect on the thirtieth day after it shall have become a law.


Text

STATE OF NEW YORK ________________________________________________________________________ 438 2013-2014 Regular Sessions IN SENATE (PREFILED) January 9, 2013 ___________
Introduced by Sens. STEWART-COUSINS, ADAMS, AVELLA, BRESLIN, DILAN, GIANARIS, HASSELL-THOMPSON, KRUEGER, LATIMER, MONTGOMERY, PARKER, PERALTA, PERKINS, RIVERA, SAMPSON, SERRANO, SQUADRON, STAVISKY -- read twice and ordered printed, and when printed to be committed to the Committee on Health AN ACT to amend the public health law, in relation to enacting the "reproductive health act" and revising existing provisions regarding abortions; to amend the penal law, the criminal procedure law, the county law and the judiciary law, in relation to abortion; to repeal certain provisions of the education law relating to the sale of contraceptives; and to repeal certain provisions of the penal law relating to abortion THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEM- BLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS: Section 1. Short title. This act shall be known and may be cited as the "reproductive health act". S 2. The public health law is amended by adding a new article 17 to read as follows: ARTICLE 17 REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH ACT SECTION 1700. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 1701. AUTHORIZED PERFORMANCE OF ABORTIONS. 1702. STATE REGULATION. 1703. DEFINITIONS. S 1700. STATEMENT OF POLICY. THE LEGISLATURE DECLARES THAT EVERY INDI- VIDUAL HAS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN PERSONAL REPRODUCTIVE DECISIONS. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK THAT: 1. EVERY INDIVIDUAL HAS THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO CHOOSE OR REFUSE CONTRACEPTION; AND 2. EVERY FEMALE HAS THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DETERMINE THE COURSE OF HER PREGNANCY, WHICH INCLUDES THE RIGHT TO CARRY A PREGNANCY TO TERM OR TO TERMINATE A PREGNANCY: (I) IN THE ABSENCE OF FETAL VIABILITY; AND
(II) AT ANY TIME IF SUCH TERMINATION IS NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE PREG- NANT FEMALE'S LIFE OR HEALTH. S 1701. AUTHORIZED PERFORMANCE OF ABORTIONS. THE PERFORMANCE OF AN ABORTION BY A QUALIFIED, LICENSED HEALTH CARE PRACTITIONER, ACTING WITH- IN THE SCOPE OF HIS OR HER PRACTICE, IS AUTHORIZED: 1. IN THE ABSENCE OF FETAL VIABILITY; AND 2. AT ANY TIME, IF IN THE GOOD FAITH MEDICAL JUDGMENT OF A PHYSICIAN, SUCH TERMINATION IS NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE FEMALE'S LIFE OR HEALTH. S 1702. STATE REGULATION. 1. THE STATE SHALL NOT DENY, REGULATE OR RESTRICT THE RIGHTS SET FORTH IN SECTION SEVENTEEN HUNDRED OF THIS ARTI- CLE BY ANY LAW, ORDINANCE, REGULATION OR POLICY EXCEPT BY LAW, REGU- LATION OR POLICY THAT IS NARROWLY TAILORED TO SERVE A COMPELLING STATE INTEREST AND EXCEPT AS SET FORTH IN SUBDIVISION THREE OF THIS SECTION. 2. THE STATE SHALL NOT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHTS SET FORTH IN SECTION SEVENTEEN HUNDRED OF THIS ARTICLE IN THE REGULATION OR PROVISION OF BENEFITS, FACILITIES, SERVICES OR INFORMATION. 3. NOTHING IN THIS ARTICLE SHALL PROHIBIT THE ENFORCEMENT OF GENERALLY APPLICABLE STATUTES, RULES OF LAW AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING MATTERS SUCH AS PRACTITIONER LICENSING, PHARMACEUTICALS AND MEDICAL DEVICES, AND MEDICAL PROCEDURES. 4. NOTHING IN THIS ARTICLE SHALL BE CONSTRUED TO CONFLICT WITH ANY APPLICABLE STATE OR FEDERAL LAW OR REGULATION PERMITTING A HEALTH CARE PROVIDER TO REFRAIN FROM PROVIDING ABORTIONS DUE TO THE PROVIDER'S RELI- GIOUS OR MORAL BELIEFS. S 1703. DEFINITIONS. THE FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS SHALL APPLY FOR PURPOSES OF THIS ARTICLE: 1. "ABORTION" MEANS THE TERMINATION OF A PREGNANCY FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN PRODUCING A LIVE BIRTH, WHICH INCLUDES BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO A TERMINATION USING PHARMACOLOGICAL AGENTS. ABORTION DOES NOT INCLUDE THE TERMINATION OF AN ECTOPIC PREGNANCY. 2. "CONTRACEPTION" MEANS ANY DRUG OR DEVICE APPROVED BY THE UNITED STATES FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF PREVENTING PREG- NANCY. 3. "GESTATIONAL AGE" MEANS THE TIME THAT HAS ELAPSED SINCE THE FIRST DAY OF THE PREGNANT FEMALE'S LAST MENSTRUAL PERIOD. 4. "PREGNANCY" MEANS THE HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE PROCESS, BEGINNING WITH THE IMPLANTATION OF A FERTILIZED EGG. 5. "STATE" MEANS THE STATE OF NEW YORK AND EVERY COUNTY, CITY, TOWN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OR QUASI-MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE STATE, INCLUDING GOVERNMENTAL AND POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS, AGENCIES AND INSTRU- MENTALITIES. 6. "FETAL VIABILITY" MEANS THE POINT IN PREGNANCY WHEN, AS DETERMINED BY A PHYSICIAN OR OTHER QUALIFIED PRACTITIONER ACTING IN GOOD FAITH WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS OR HER PRACTICE IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERALLY ACCEPTED MEDICAL STANDARDS APPLIED TO THE PARTICULAR FACTS OF THE CASE BEFORE THAT PRACTITIONER: (A) THE GESTATIONAL AGE OF THE FETUS IS TWEN- TY-FOUR WEEKS OR MORE, AND (B) THERE IS A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD OF THE FETUS'S SUSTAINED SURVIVAL OUTSIDE THE UTERUS WITHOUT THE APPLICATION OF EXTRAORDINARY MEDICAL MEASURES. S 3. Subdivision 1 of section 4164 of the public health law, as added by chapter 991 of the laws of 1974, is amended to read as follows: 1. [When an abortion is to be performed after the twelfth week of pregnancy it shall be performed only in a hospital and only on an in-pa- tient basis.] When an abortion is to be performed after [the twentieth week of pregnancy,] FETAL VIABILITY, AS THAT TERM IS DEFINED BY SUBDIVI- SION SIX OF SECTION SEVENTEEN HUNDRED THREE OF THIS CHAPTER, IT SHALL BE
PERFORMED BY A PHYSICIAN IN A FACILITY WHICH IS LICENSED BY THE DEPART- MENT PURSUANT TO ARTICLE TWENTY-EIGHT OF THIS CHAPTER AND a physician other than the physician performing the abortion shall be in attendance to take control of and to provide immediate medical care for any live birth that is the result of the abortion, PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT AN ABORTION SHALL NOT BE DELAYED FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING SUCH SECOND PHYSICIAN'S ATTENDANCE IF, IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE PHYSICIAN PERFORMING THE ABORTION, SUCH DELAY WOULD POSE A RISK TO THE FEMALE'S LIFE OR HEALTH. The commissioner [of health] is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations to insure the health and safety of the mother and the [viable child] LIVE BIRTH, in such instances. S 4. Subdivision 8 of section 6811 of the education law is REPEALED. S 5. Sections 125.40, 125.45, 125.50, 125.55 and 125.60 of the penal law are REPEALED, and the article heading of article 125 of the penal law is amended to read as follows: HOMICIDE[, ABORTION] AND RELATED OFFENSES S 6. Section 125.00 of the penal law is amended to read as follows: S 125.00 Homicide defined. Homicide means conduct which causes the death of a person [or an unborn child with which a female has been pregnant for more than twen- ty-four weeks] under circumstances constituting murder, manslaughter in the first degree, manslaughter in the second degree, OR criminally negligent homicide[, abortion in the first degree or self-abortion in the first degree]. S 7. Section 125.05 of the penal law, subdivision 3 as amended by chapter 127 of the laws of 1970, is amended to read as follows: S 125.05 Homicide[, abortion] and related offenses; [definitions of terms] PERSON DEFINED. [The following definitions are applicable to this article: 1. "Person,"] FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS ARTICLE, THE TERM "PERSON," when referring to the victim of a homicide, means a human being who has been born and is alive. [2. "Abortional act" means an act committed upon or with respect to a female, whether by another person or by the female herself, whether she is pregnant or not, whether directly upon her body or by the administer- ing, taking or prescription of drugs or in any other manner, with intent to cause a miscarriage of such female. 3. "Justifiable abortional act." An abortional act is justifiable when committed upon a female with her consent by a duly licensed physician acting (a) under a reasonable belief that such is necessary to preserve her life, or, (b) within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her pregnancy. A pregnant female's commission of an abortional act upon herself is justifiable when she acts upon the advice of a duly licensed physician (1) that such act is necessary to preserve her life, or, (2) within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her pregnancy. The submission by a female to an abortional act is justifiable when she believes that it is being committed by a duly licensed physician, acting under a reasonable belief that such act is necessary to preserve her life, or, within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her pregnan- cy.] S 8. Section 125.15 of the penal law is amended to read as follows: S 125.15 Manslaughter in the second degree. A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when: 1. He OR SHE recklessly causes the death of another person; or
2. [He commits upon a female an abortional act which causes her death, unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of section 125.05; or 3.] He OR SHE intentionally causes or aids another person to commit suicide. Manslaughter in the second degree is a class C felony. S 9. Section 125.20 of the penal law, subdivision 3 as amended and subdivision 4 as added by chapter 477 of the laws of 1990, is amended to read as follows: S 125.20 Manslaughter in the first degree. A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: 1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he OR SHE causes the death of such person or of a third person; or 2. With intent to cause the death of another person, he OR SHE causes the death of such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 125.25. The fact that homicide was committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need not be proved in any prosecution initiated under this subdivision; or 3. [He commits upon a female pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks an abortional act which causes her death, unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of section 125.05; or 4.] Being eighteen years old or more and with intent to cause physical injury to [a] ANOTHER person less than eleven years old, [the defendant] HE OR SHE recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of serious physical injury to such person and thereby causes the death of such person. Manslaughter in the first degree is a class B felony. S 10. Paragraph (b) of subdivision 8 of section 700.05 of the criminal procedure law, as amended by chapter 405 of the laws of 2010, is amended to read as follows: (b) Any of the following felonies: assault in the second degree as defined in section 120.05 of the penal law, assault in the first degree as defined in section 120.10 of the penal law, reckless endangerment in the first degree as defined in section 120.25 of the penal law, promot- ing a suicide attempt as defined in section 120.30 of the penal law, strangulation in the second degree as defined in section 121.12 of the penal law, strangulation in the first degree as defined in section 121.13 of the penal law, criminally negligent homicide as defined in section 125.10 of the penal law, manslaughter in the second degree as defined in section 125.15 of the penal law, manslaughter in the first degree as defined in section 125.20 of the penal law, murder in the second degree as defined in section 125.25 of the penal law, murder in the first degree as defined in section 125.27 of the penal law, [abortion in the second degree as defined in section 125.40 of the penal law, abortion in the first degree as defined in section 125.45 of the penal law,] rape in the third degree as defined in section 130.25 of the penal law, rape in the second degree as defined in section 130.30 of the penal law, rape in the first degree as defined in section 130.35 of the penal law, criminal sexual act in the third degree as defined in section 130.40 of the penal law, criminal sexual act in the second degree as defined in section 130.45 of the penal law, criminal sexual act in the first degree as defined in section 130.50 of the penal law, sexual abuse in the first degree as defined in section 130.65 of the penal law,
unlawful imprisonment in the first degree as defined in section 135.10 of the penal law, kidnapping in the second degree as defined in section 135.20 of the penal law, kidnapping in the first degree as defined in section 135.25 of the penal law, labor trafficking as defined in section 135.35 of the penal law, custodial interference in the first degree as defined in section 135.50 of the penal law, coercion in the first degree as defined in section 135.65 of the penal law, criminal trespass in the first degree as defined in section 140.17 of the penal law, burglary in the third degree as defined in section 140.20 of the penal law, burglary in the second degree as defined in section 140.25 of the penal law, burglary in the first degree as defined in section 140.30 of the penal law, criminal mischief in the third degree as defined in section 145.05 of the penal law, criminal mischief in the second degree as defined in section 145.10 of the penal law, criminal mischief in the first degree as defined in section 145.12 of the penal law, criminal tampering in the first degree as defined in section 145.20 of the penal law, arson in the fourth degree as defined in section 150.05 of the penal law, arson in the third degree as defined in section 150.10 of the penal law, arson in the second degree as defined in section 150.15 of the penal law, arson in the first degree as defined in section 150.20 of the penal law, grand larceny in the fourth degree as defined in section 155.30 of the penal law, grand larceny in the third degree as defined in section 155.35 of the penal law, grand larceny in the second degree as defined in section 155.40 of the penal law, grand larceny in the first degree as defined in section 155.42 of the penal law, health care fraud in the fourth degree as defined in section 177.10 of the penal law, health care fraud in the third degree as defined in section 177.15 of the penal law, health care fraud in the second degree as defined in section 177.20 of the penal law, health care fraud in the first degree as defined in section 177.25 of the penal law, robbery in the third degree as defined in section 160.05 of the penal law, robbery in the second degree as defined in section 160.10 of the penal law, robbery in the first degree as defined in section 160.15 of the penal law, unlawful use of secret scientific material as defined in section 165.07 of the penal law, criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree as defined in section 165.45 of the penal law, criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree as defined in section 165.50 of the penal law, criminal possession of stolen property in the second degree as defined by section 165.52 of the penal law, criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree as defined by section 165.54 of the penal law, trademark counterfeiting in the second degree as defined in section 165.72 of the penal law, trademark counterfeiting in the first degree as defined in section 165.73 of the penal law, forgery in the second degree as defined in section 170.10 of the penal law, forgery in the first degree as defined in section 170.15 of the penal law, criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree as defined in section 170.25 of the penal law, criminal possession of a forged instrument in the first degree as defined in section 170.30 of the penal law, criminal possession of forgery devices as defined in section 170.40 of the penal law, falsifying business records in the first degree as defined in section 175.10 of the penal law, tampering with public records in the first degree as defined in section 175.25 of the penal law, offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree as defined in section 175.35 of the penal law, issuing a false certificate as defined in section 175.40 of the penal law, criminal diversion of prescription medications and prescriptions in the second degree as defined in section
178.20 of the penal law, criminal diversion of prescription medications and prescriptions in the first degree as defined in section 178.25 of the penal law, residential mortgage fraud in the fourth degree as defined in section 187.10 of the penal law, residential mortgage fraud in the third degree as defined in section 187.15 of the penal law, resi- dential mortgage fraud in the second degree as defined in section 187.20 of the penal law, residential mortgage fraud in the first degree as defined in section 187.25 of the penal law, escape in the second degree as defined in section 205.10 of the penal law, escape in the first degree as defined in section 205.15 of the penal law, absconding from temporary release in the first degree as defined in section 205.17 of the penal law, promoting prison contraband in the first degree as defined in section 205.25 of the penal law, hindering prosecution in the second degree as defined in section 205.60 of the penal law, hindering prosecution in the first degree as defined in section 205.65 of the penal law, sex trafficking as defined in section 230.34 of the penal law, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree as defined in subdivisions two, three and five of section 265.02 of the penal law, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree as defined in section 265.03 of the penal law, criminal possession of a weapon in the first degree as defined in section 265.04 of the penal law, manufacture, transport, disposition and defacement of weapons and dangerous instru- ments and appliances defined as felonies in subdivisions one, two, and three of section 265.10 of the penal law, sections 265.11, 265.12 and 265.13 of the penal law, or prohibited use of weapons as defined in subdivision two of section 265.35 of the penal law, relating to firearms and other dangerous weapons, or failure to disclose the origin of a recording in the first degree as defined in section 275.40 of the penal law; S 11. Subdivision 1 of section 673 of the county law, as added by chapter 545 of the laws of 1965, is amended to read as follows: 1. A coroner or medical examiner has jurisdiction and authority to investigate the death of every person dying within his county, or whose body is found within the county, which is or appears to be: (a) A violent death, whether by criminal violence, suicide or casual- ty; (b) A death caused by unlawful act or criminal neglect; (c) A death occurring in a suspicious, unusual or unexplained manner; (d) [A death caused by suspected criminal abortion; (e)] A death while unattended by a physician, so far as can be discov- ered, or where no physician able to certify the cause of death as provided in the public health law and in form as prescribed by the commissioner of health can be found; [(f)] (E) A death of a person confined in a public institution other than a hospital, infirmary or nursing home. S 12. Section 4 of the judiciary law, as amended by chapter 264 of the laws of 2003, is amended to read as follows: S 4. Sittings of courts to be public. The sittings of every court within this state shall be public, and every citizen may freely attend the same, except that in all proceedings and trials in cases for divorce, seduction, [abortion,] rape, assault with intent to commit rape, criminal sexual act, bastardy or filiation, the court may, in its discretion, exclude therefrom all persons who are not directly inter- ested therein, excepting jurors, witnesses, and officers of the court. S 13. This act shall take effect on the thirtieth day after it shall have become a law.

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